Populism

The European states’ party systems have transformed since World War Two, even if, from the perspective of time, they seem exceedingly stable. To the contemporary observer, the framework consists of social democrats who have abandoned their revolutionary dreams and a moderate right wing agreeing to a welfare state in order to maintain liberal freedoms. There was no shortage of violent transformations, such as the breakdown of the communist parties in the west following the crisis and disintegration of “real socialism,” or the disintegration of the hegemonic Christian democracy in Italy in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, on a continental scale there were never such great shifts as after 2008. Some previously significant parties (the Greek socialists, PASOK) vanished, or had to be content with a second-string position (Spain’s PSOE).²

As a Spanish politician and political scientist has observed, the pace of economic development is not a key factor in our voting decisions. That is, if we are talking about a GDP growth rate of two or three points, not about the depths of a recession…³

Ever since the 1980s, a slow ideological change has occurred in the main political parties—the left wing has ditched the anti-capitalist discourse, focusing on how to manage the free-market globalization so as to retain some elements of the welfare state. The right wing suggests an increased economic development in exchange for having dismantled social welfare, which was said to inhibit competitiveness on a global scale. The events of 2008 revealed the weakness of both positions and offered stages for new concepts. Among them were movements that swiftly became known as populist.⁴

According to one German political scientist, populists base their ideologies on a division between the good masses (the famous 99 per cent) and the bad elite. This is combined with the actual rejection of political pluralism—given that the competitor is basically a representative of a more-or-less corrupt ruling group, it is hard to reach a consensus even in vital matters.⁵ After all, discussing with the elites could lead the populists’ supporters to decide that their leaders themselves had become representatives of that elite.

Most populist parties call themselves right-wing, but there are also left-wing exponents. As with Spain’s Podemos, they may be linked to the old communist parties, whether through their members’ biographies or their election alliances, yet they differ in terms of their styles and programs. “Banking, finances, debt emerge as the regular parts of the subject’s make-up that ought to be opposed. Nonetheless, there are no proposed alternatives to capitalism, nor are there any particular regulations as you have in a social democracy; the economy only has to serve an undefined majority.”⁶

According to Jan-Werner Muller, populists use the tools of democracy to dismantle its institutions, less to build a dictatorship than to introduce a kind of constant chaos that allows them to stay in power. While in Europe left-wing populists have had no opportunity to work this way—though in Latin America they certainly have⁷—they have given rise to political elements that many commentators believe harm democratic standards. One example is “escraches,”⁸ that is, protests in front of politicians’ homes, or (paradoxically) the strengthening of charismatic political leadership. Not trusting party bureaucracy and encouraging direct democracy, they helped media-savvy leaders gain power, which can hinder the proper functioning of a civil society.⁹

On the other hand, we might also interpret populist movements as a symptom of a healthy, functioning democracy and a way to remind the fossilized parties that society is not purely a passive subject.