Catalonia and Scotland

Tensions over ethnic issues did not vanish after World War Two, though the Cold War limited their progress in Europe. Potential conflicts found mighty arbiters—the Soviet Union, after all, would not have allowed Polish-Czech antagonism to develop.² This does not mean, of course, that we ought to glorify Moscow’s policies, as some historians have done³—these same policies resorted to resettlement, mass persecution, and meddling with national disputes when it served Soviet interests. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, conflicts were ironed out by the new hegemon, the United States.⁴

Despite the lack of serious conflicts between the countries of Europe, apart from the matter of Cyprus, there was plenty of internal violence. Here the Basque ETA and the Irish IRA were most problematic, both of them with hundreds of death on their consciences, including many civilians. In the 1990s, the ethnic cleansings that came with the disintegration of Yugoslavia sent out international shockwaves.

In this context, the events following 2008 appear to have been relatively civilized, if only for their lack of casualties—however difficult these may have been to foresee, given that national emotions easily slip out of control. This is particularly true when activists adopt illegal methods, as was the case with the Catalan independence activists.

Both in Scotland and Catalonia, we are dealing with a network of factors, some entirely unrelated to the 2008 recession. Both nations have long histories, though they have been inextricably linked to the histories of England and Spain since the seventeenth and fifteenth centuries (back before the modern nation-state was invented).⁵ The Scots and Catalans are culturally distinct, though only in the latter case through language—even before their countries united, English had become the language of the Scottish elite. Yet we need not reach so far into the past—both Edinburgh and Barcelona are important urban centers. The inhabitants of metropolises without the privileges accorded to a capital city can feel frustrated.

Independence movements like to draw upon historical and economic arguments. As if it were not enough that nations were exploited in the past, they still remain exploited by “others.” Sometimes relations of this sort really did exist in the past, or do to this day, but usually things are more complicated.

Catalans can point to actual repression of their culture during General Franco’s dictatorship. Yet we must recall that many nationalists from Barcelona supported the generals’ coup, being more afraid of their local revolutionaries than the Madrid reactionaries. And naturally, Catalonia contributes more to Spain’s budget than it receives, but it also takes advantage of being a part of the Spanish state, which is a natural gateway to business contacts in Latin America.⁶

Examining ressentiments of this sort, which are often bilateral, is not easy. A historian and sociologist cannot deny someone their national feelings, even knowing they are based on myths or falsehoods. After all, some are not. This explains the difficulty in resolving conflicts of this kind—unlike in economics, it is hard to find a “technical” solution.

We should also stress that the 2008 crisis was a kind of wind in the sails of nationalist movements. Suffering as a result of unemployment and the drop in living standards was easily blamed on the “center,” sucking the vital energies out of the regions which would “undoubtedly” be flourishing if only they had independence.